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Abstract
This dissertation presents the results of a series of simulations intended to expand the findings of
Burkett and Griffiths (2009, 2010), whose model is shown to make a number of assumptions that
may be unrealistic with regard to human language learners. These assumptions are modified to
create a number of more realistic scenarios. A series of simulations shows that the concentration
parameter α continues to affect the outcome of iterated learning with Bayesian learners in these
new scenarios. To overcome the need for the concentration parameter to be specified by the
modeller, a model is presented where agents learn a complex hypothesis composed of both a
distribution of languages within a population and the appropriate value for α. The outcome of
the simulations based on this model are inconclusive but do hint at the possibility of α being
affected by iterated learning, potentially enabling learners to acquire a complex hypothesis.
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This dissertation presents the results of a series of simulations that expand on the findings of
Burkett and Griffiths (2009, 2010), who discuss a Bayesian iterated learning model (ILM) where
each learner receives input from multiple members of the previous generation and has the task
of inferring the distribution of languages within a population of agents. Using Bayesian learners
sampling from the posterior distribution of hypotheses, their simulations show that convergence
on the distribution determined by their prior biases depends on learners’ expectations concerning
the number of languages their input was produced from. These expectations are expressed in
the concentration parameter α that parameterises the distribution over hypotheses. For larger
values of α, learners expect more variety in their input, whereas for smaller values of α, they
expect the data to have been produced by fewer languages. In the latter case, the outcome of the
iterated learning process is determined by the input received by the first generation of learners,
with learners sampling a hypothesis that magnifies the share of the language represented in
the input more frequently. These findings are in line with those of Griffiths and Kalish (2005,
2007), who came to similar conclusions for transmission chains consisting of a single agent per
generation.
Taking the results of Burkett and Griffiths (2009, 2010) as its starting point, this paper
discusses a number of modifications and extensions to the original model. Burkett and Griffiths
(2009, 2010) make a number of assumptions that, while not unreasonable, might affect the
outcome of their simulations. Firstly, they assume that all agents within the population share
the same value for α. Secondly, they assume that each item of input learners receive is produced
by an agent randomly sampled from the population. Thirdly, learners only generate a single
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hypothesis rather than learning incrementally, adapting their hypothesis in the light of each new
data item. Finally, all transmission takes place vertically, with the learners’ data being produced
exclusively by agents from the previous generation. The first four sets of simulations presented
here are intended to determine whether changing these assumptions affects the outcome of
iterated learning. Secondly, as mentioned above, whether learners’ prior biases or the input
received by the first generation of learners play a greater role in determining the outcome of
iterated learning depends on their expectations about how many languages their input was
generated from; this is determined by the value of the concentration parameter α. Burkett and
Griffiths (2009, 2010) leave open the matter of how α is assigned a value. One way of addressing
this issue, namely learning both α and a hypothesis regarding the distribution of languages
within the population in a hierarchical Bayesian model, is described and evaluated in the fifth
and final set of simulations.
Chapter 2 provides the intellectual backdrop for the discussion to follow. The next two
chapters provide descriptions of the frameworks used both here and by Burkett and Griffiths
(2009, 2010), the iterated learning model and Bayesian learning. Chapter 5 presents the details
of the two-language model used in Burkett and Griffiths (2009). Chapter 6 discusses some of
the assumptions made by Burkett and Griffiths (2009, 2010) and presents the results of a series
of simulations in each of which one of these assumptions is changed. Chapter 7 presents a model
where agents learn a complex hypothesis consisting of both a distribution over languages and a




Estimates concerning the number of languages spoken in the world today vary widely (Crystal,
2000). Ethnologue (Lewis, 2009) gives the number of languages as 6909, 473 of which are
classified as “nearly extinct”; many more have come and gone. Whatever the exact number,
this degree of variety within the communication system of a single species is unique. Nonetheless,
all languages can be analysed as having various levels of structure, be it phonological, syntactic
or semantic, and a considerable amount of research is devoted to determining which language
universals, i.e. underlying structural properties shared by all languages, exist.1 Furthermore, all
languages arguably share the property that they can be readily learned by human children with
little or no explicit tutoring (pathologies notwithstanding). Indeed, it is conceivable that a child
might be raised in a society other than that into which it was born and acquire the language of
the former such that the language of the latter would leave no trace, and while there are ethical
objections to testing this claim experimentally, research with Korean adoptees raised in France
(Ventureyra et al., 2004) suggest that it is in fact correct.
Assuming language universals exist and children really are capable of acquiring any human
language, it might be interesting to ask whether these two facts are in some way related and
how they may be related. In other words, are children’s language acquisition skills related to the
structural similarities shared by all languages? If so, what is the nature of this relationship? The
absence of any sizeable debate about the question suggests that the answer to the first question
is considered to be “yes”: although there is no prima facie reason to believe that this should
1That such universals do exist, while not wholly uncontroversial (see Evans and Levinson, 2009, for a somewhat
polemical discussion of the subject), is widely assumed to be true.
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necessarily be so, assuming it to be the case is without doubt a more parsimonious explanation
than positing two separate mechanisms, one facilitating language acquisition, the other ensuring
the existence of language universals.2
The second question, on the other hand, has been the source of considerable debate. Some
researchers (e.g. Pinker and Bloom, 1990; Hauser et al., 2002; Jackendoff, 2003) have suggested
that humans possess a biological endowment, commonly referred to as the language faculty
(Fitch et al., 2005; Jackendoff and Pinker, 2005) or – “somewhat unfortunately”, as Zuidema
(2003) remarks – Universal Grammar. This language organ (Anderson and Lightfoot, 2002)
may have emerged as a gradual adaptation, as suggested by Pinker and Bloom (1990) and
Pinker and Jackendoff (2005), or as a spandrel, as Hauser et al. (2002) claim. It may consist
of an ability to process recursive structures (Hauser et al., 2002; Fitch et al., 2005), a set of
parameters describing linguistic features that are weighted statistically according to the input
the language learner receives (Yang, 2004), or some rich set of features that evolved piecemeal
(Jackendoff and Pinker, 2005). Regardless of its exact nature, the function of Universal Grammar
is essentially always the same: it limits the number of possible grammars a child must consider
when attempting to acquire a language. Without such constraints, it is claimed (Gold, 1967;
Chomsky, 1965), children would be unable to determine the grammar of the language their
are confronted with. Gold (1967)’s theoretical results are generally thought to support the
argument from the poverty of the stimulus (POS), which claims that the input children receive
when acquiring a language is insufficient, or too impoverished, for the language acquisition
process to be successful unless some kind of constraints are in place to limit the number of
possible grammars the learner will contemplate.3 Since children clearly are capable of acquiring
a language, there must be a set of constraints in place to enable this process. Furthermore, since
these constraints cannot be learned, they must be innate and therefore biological. Since this set
of constraints specifies which human languages are possible and therefore also determines what
all languages have in common.
The “innateness hypothesis” (Putnam, 1967) and POS have been controversial since they
were first proposed by Chomsky (1965). Nonetheless, over the past forty years, a great deal
of research in linguistics has been based to a greater or lesser extent on some version or other
of the hypothesis.4 In recent years, however, it has come under increasing scrutiny, partly due
2Depending on how one is inclined to define what a language is, it may be all but impossible to posit two
different mechanisms. See Steels (2000) for a brief discussion of the difficulties of defining a language.
3See Thomas (2002) for an overview of the history of POS.
4It is interesting to note that philosophers have been largely critical of the hypothesis. Putnam (1967), for
example, states that the innateness hypothesis is “daring – or apparently daring; it may be meaningless, in which
case it is not daring”; Goodman (1967) provides an amusing yet thorough critique of Chomsky (1965)’s ideas in
the style of a Platonic dialogue. See also Mameli and Bateson (2006) and Godfrey-Smith (2007) for more recent
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to growing doubts regarding the validity of POS. Firstly, a number of researchers (e.g. Pullum
and Scholz, 2002; Sampson, 2005) suggest that the input children receive is not as impoverished
as it is made out to be. Others (Scholz and Pullum, 2002; Zuidema, 2003) claim that Gold
(1967)’s results do not support POS in the way many linguists believe them to. Some authors
(e.g. Kirby, 2001; Zuidema, 2003; Chater and Christiansen, 2010) suggest that rather than being
a problem that language learners must overcome, POS allows learners to modify the language
they are learning, thereby making it more learnable. As Zuidema (2003) puts it, “the poverty
of the stimulus solves the poverty of the stimulus (emphasis added).” On this view, languages
are shaped to a considerable extent by the process of being transmitted from one generation
to the next, and the transmission process is determined by biological and cultural factors that
influence the learning process.
Secondly, although it is generally accepted that there must be some sort of constraints on the
set of possible languages children will entertain when learning a language, it does not follow that
these constraints must be innate or biological. That claim is based on the implicit assumption
of a modularised mind where the language faculty is shielded in some way from developments
in, say, the social skills faculty.5 Some researchers (e.g. Goldberg, 2003; Tomasello, 2003, 2005;
Sperber and Origgi, 2010) believe that constraints may arise from other aspects of a learner’s
maturational process. Tomasello (2003), for example, suggests that children are able to solve
the Gavagai problem (Quine, 1975) because the joint attentional frame they construct when
attending to something with mature speakers effectively restricts the set of possible meanings
that they will entertain for unknown words to aspects of that attentional frame. The same self-
imposed restriction may also allow children to determine cross-situational regularities regarding
grammatical constructions (Goldberg, 2003). Similarly, Sperber and Origgi (2010) point out
that pragmatic factors dependent on “näıve psychology” play an important role in language
acquisition and evolution.6
Chater and Christiansen (2010) refer to the task language learners face as C-induction, or
learning to coordinate with each other. The example they provide to distinguish this from N-
induction, or learning to model the world, illustrates the distinction very well: imagine being
critical discussions of the concept of innateness.
5I am using the idea of a social skills faculty for the sake of argument; I am not suggesting that there is such
a vague thing – although given that the vague idea of a language faculty is widely entertained, it is possible that
someone will propose it.
6Such claims may be supported by analytic results concerning the population dynamics of language evolution
(Nowak et al., 2000) which suggest that natural selection will only favour syntactic communication once there are
a sufficiently large number of events where communication about these events contributes to individuals’ fitness,
that is, once there are enough things worth talking about. It could be argued that the human ability to use
metarepresentations (Sperber, 2000) or to share intentionality (Tomasello, 2005) provides exactly that increase in
the number of “newsworthy” events to initiate the emergence of syntactic communication while also restricting
the possible meanings a hearer might entertain to exactly those metarepresentations or intentions. A detailed
discussion of this idea is, unfortunately, outwith the scope of this dissertation.
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asked how the sequence 1,2,3,. . . continues. There are an infinite number of possible sequences
that start in this way, 1,2,3,2,1,2,. . . , say, or 1,2,3,1,2,3,1,. . . , or even 1,2,3,π,-4.76,. . . . How-
ever, Chater and Christiansen (2010) argue that the most natural way for us to assume that the
sequence continues is . . . 4,5,6,. . . . Since most people will continue the sequence in this fash-
ion, they claim, this sequence will be suggested far more frquently than the number of possible
continuations would lead one to expect. This is because C-induction is affected by cognitive
biases shared by all humans: if everybody has a tendency to answer a question in the same way,
that answer will come to dominate.7 In other words, given incomplete information regarding a
system (such as a sequence), humans will “fill in the gaps” on the basis of their own biases. In-
corporating these biases into the system makes it easier for the system to remain intact through
transmission. The idea of language as an adaptive system (e.g. Kirby, 2001, 2002; Kirby et al.,
2008) relies heavily on the idea that, to ensure successful transmission, languages adapt to hu-
man biases, making it easier for learners to induce a language on the basis of a small subset
thereof. This is possible precisely because the biases incorporated are shared by both teacher
and learner.
In addition to arguing that the task facing learners is in fact easier than POS assumes it
to be, it has also been suggested that learning from data is more powerful than granted by
proponents of UG. Saffran et al. (1996) show that infants as young as 8 months are sensitive
to the different transitional probabilities between syllables within nonce words and those across
word boundaries after only a few minutes of exposure; Maye et al. (2002) found that even
6-month-olds are sensitive to distributional information regarding phonetic variation. Gerken
et al. (2005) present evidence that, under certain circumstances, infants might be able to form
syntactic categories on the basis of distributional cues. Research by Gómez (2002) and Gökaydin
et al. (in press) shows that learners can employ different statistical analyses depending on the
input they receive, and Monaghan et al. (2005) show that learners may use a combination of
distributional and other cues when learning a language. A number of papers (e.g. Rowland
et al., 2003; Theakston et al., 2003) suggest that the acquisition of syntactic constructions
depends greatly on the type of input learners receive, and Perfors et al. (2010) show that child-
directed speech allows Bayesian learners with domain-general abilities to infer a hierarchical
phrase-structure grammar.
Together, these results cast doubt on the validity of POS. There are, however, other reasons
to question the existence of an innate biological set of constraints on language acquisition.
7If one substitutes the term paradigm for cognitive bias, this is not unlike Kuhn (1962)’s view of science.
Ironically, the UG paradigm can then be seen as exactly the kind of bias that leads researchers to answer questions
in certain ways.
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Christiansen and Chater (2008), for example, argue that the language faculty cannot be a
biological adaptation because language change occurs too quickly for genetic adaptations for
many linguistic features to evolve. Kirby et al. (2007) discuss how iterated learning with Bayesian
learners selecting a hypothesis with maximum posterior probability can obscure the strength of
the learners’ biases, making it impossible for natural selection to act on strong biases, because
what is being selected for, namely the outcome of the learning process, is not determined by the
strength of the bias alone. Smith and Kirby (2008) present similar findings: cultural transmission
can shield the language faculty from biological selection, making it less likely for a UG with strong
constraints to evolve. Ladd et al. (2008) discuss an example of this, the differences between vowel
formants in Italian and Yoruba: while these differences may, as Ladefoged (1984, cited by Ladd
et al., 2008) suggests, be due to anatomical differences between the languages’ speakers, these
genetically inherited differences can be overcome: a Yoruba may still learn to speak perfect
Italian and vice versa. Thus, although genetically determined traits have affected the languages
spoken, the differences between the languages themselves have not arisen due to biological
selection and can be overcome by learners. Finally, Dediu (2008) raises the question of whether
models of language evolution relying on cultural processes (e.g. Kirby, 2001; Brighton, 2002)
require a modern brain at all, and although the question is seemingly intended as a criticism of
such models, the question can be turned around (as Tomasello, 2003, does): Why should one
bother positing a biologically determined UG imposing strong constraints on language learners,
when the cultural transmission process provides sufficient constraints to explain the emergence
of human language and language universals?
Nobody denies that biological evolution plays some part in the emergence of language. The
issue, rather, is whether biological selective pressures may have given rise to domain-specific
constraints which in turn may have resulted in the phenomena outlined at the beginning of
this chapter, viz., the possible existence of language universals and children’s ability to acquire
any human language. A growing body of evidence indicates that the constraints giving rise
to language universals need not be determined biologically, but may arise from the language
learning process itself. The task at hand, then, is to provide an alternative account of how
language emerges. The following two chapters will discuss two frameworks that fufil different
parts of this task: iterated learning and Bayesian learning.
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CHAPTER 3
The Iterated Learning Model
The Iterated Learning Model (ILM) was introduced by Kirby (2001) as a way of modelling the
effects on a language of being transmitted along chains of learners.1 As a rule, it has four basic
components (Kirby and Hurford, 2002):
1. one or more learning agents;
2. one or more teaching agents;
3. a meaning space; and
4. a signal space.
When implemented computationally, the first generation, or cohort (Smith, 2002), of agents is
initialised with a set of data, commonly consisting of mappings between signals and meanings.2
On the basis of these data, each agent then generates a hypothesis regarding the nature of these
mappings. The agent then produces a set of such mappings itself, which is then used as input
to the subsequent cohort in the transmission chain. Crucially, the set of mappings produced by
the agent also includes mappings for meanings it did not encounter in the data it learned from.
The agent receives no positive or negative feedback during this phase, making the outcome of
1Note that this is not meant to imply that the ILM refers exclusively to chains of single learners; a scenario
where multiple learners have multiple, possibly identical, teachers may still be implemented as an ILM. Niyogi and
Berwick (2009)’s criticism of the ILM in this particular respect suggests an exceptionally narrow interpretation
of the model.
2This need not necessarily be the case; whether the specification of distinct meaning and signal spaces are
required depends on what is being modelled. The models reported in later chapters, for example, do not distin-
guish between a meaning and a signal space because the distinction is not relevant to what is being modelled.
Nevertheless, a large number of ILMS do make use of separate meaning and signal spaces.
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IL independent of an agent’s communicative success. The initialisation step aside, this process
is repeated a large number of times, or until a stable state is attained where successive cohorts
produce the same mappings.
The ILM has proved very popular, with numerous in silico experiments being conducted
within the framework. Many of these simulations (Hurford, 2000; Kirby, 2001; Brighton, 2002;
Smith et al., 2003) suggest that the emergence of languages with features such as generality or
regularity – universals whose emergence has been modelled using ILMs (Kirby, 2001, e.g.) – can
emerge from the process by which languages are transmitted rather than any built-in properties
of the agents involved. The main factors determining whether or not compositional languages
emerge are
– the amount of data available to the learner relative to the size of the language being learnt,
widely referred to as the transmission bottleneck (Kirby, 2001; Brighton, 2002); and
– the structure of the meaning space.
The first point is obvious at the limit: if an agent were provided with a data set containing a
mapping for each meaning, it would be able simply to reproduce the appropriate signal when
called upon to produce a signal itself. The language system would be a static one. As Brighton
(2002) points out, in the ILM, it is the transmission bottleneck that causes POS. The interesting
point is that in the ILM, POS affects the structure of the language agents acquire. Mappings
frequently present in the data are more faithfully reproduced than infrequent ones; as a result,
the latter are more likely to be subject to regularisation when agents are called upon to produce
signals for them (Kirby, 2001; Hurford, 2000).
The second point, on the other hand, is slightly more difficult to deal with. One point
criticised, for example, by Swarup and Gasser (2009) and Smith (2001, 2005) is that, in many
implementations of the ILM, agents share a common meaning space – unlike humans, who are
generally thought to have minds of their own. However, Kirby (2007) and Smith (2005) show
that the outcome of IL is essentially the same if learners do not share a common meaning space.
Moreover, it has been shown (e.g. Steels, 2000; Smith, 2001; Barr, 2004) that agents are capable
of constructing individual meaning spaces and using them to communicate. Thus, while many
implementations of the ILM provide their agents with a common meaning space, this is can
be seen as an implementational simplification rather than a prerequisite for the success of such
models.
Both Kalish et al. (2007) and Mesoudi et al. (2006) point out that iterated learning experi-
ments with human subjects were being conducted as early as the 1930s (Bartlett, 1932, referred
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to in Mesoudi et al., 2006), albeit not to test hypotheses about language. Recently there have
been a number of new experiments implementing ILMs with humans rather than software agents
(e.g. Kalish et al., 2007; Kirby et al., 2008; Beppu and Griffiths, 2009; Xu et al., 2010, Perfors
and Navarro, in press) for the purpose of validating theoretical findings obtained from com-
putational experiments.3 Kirby et al. (2008), for example, were able to confirm that iterated
learning in chains of humans resulted in linguistic structure emerging, and Perfors and Navarro
(in press) showed that the outcome of iterated learning with humans depends, inter alia, on
the structure of the meaning space. However, more experimental work is required to determine
which theoretical results from simulations within the IL framework apply to human learners.
The limited amount of experimental replication of results is not the only criticism that can
be levelled at the ILM. The model itself is not without flaws, and critics have been quick to
point them out. These flaws are
1. the absence of horizontal transmission, i.e. learning from peers (Vogt, 2005);
2. the use of transmission chains consisting of a single learner per generation (Niyogi and
Berwick, 2009; Dediu, 2009);
3. the possibility of the emergent universal such as compositionality being built in to the
model (Swarup and Gasser, 2009).4
Each of these criticisms, however, has been addressed. For example, Vogt (2005) showed that
allowing horizontal as well as vertical transmission acted as an implicit bottleneck, rendering an
explicit bottleneck imposed by the modeller superfluous, and Niyogi and Berwick (2009)’s social
learning model is an ILM that allows learners to receive input from multiple adults, as is Smith
(2009)’s model.5
As for compositionality being built in to the model, there are, I believe, two ways in which
this may be the case. Firstly, by providing a structured meaning space to communicate about,
modellers might be providing a “blueprint” of sorts for structured communication about those
meanings. This may be inevitable (or even desirable) if one assumes that linguistic structure
reflects meaning structure in some way (Kirby, 2007). Secondly, the algorithm learners use
to process the input they receive may in some way contain the basis of linguistic structure
which emerges as a result of IL. The first case has been dealt with, as mentioned previously, in
3See Mesoudi and Whiten (2008) for further examples, as well as a review of alternative methods for modelling
cultural transmission, such as the replacement method implemented by Smith (2002).
4Compositionality is mentioned here because it is the language univesal which has attracted the most attention
with regard to the ILM (Kirby et al., 2007).
5Niyogi and Berwick (2009)’s point about chains of single learners possibly influencing the dynamics of learning
is certainly valid, the suggestion that social learning is something other than a type of ILM less so.
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experiments concerned with the construction of a meaning space (e.g. Smith, 2001; Steels, 2000;
Kirby, 2007).6 If one assumes that agents have the ability to structure their meaning space in
some fashion – an assumption that is not unreasonable, given that humans appear to have such
an ability (Kemp et al., 2007) –, then it is possible for agents to communicate about the objects
associated with the meanings they construct. The second issue is due at least in part to the
variety of algorithms that agents are implemented with in ILMs: while the model provides a clear
description of the transmission process, the issue of how to model agents’ cognitive processes
goes largely unanswered. In Hurford (2000) and Kirby (2001), for example, agents use heuristic
algorithms to induce a grammar, whereas Smith et al. (2003) implements agents as associative
networks.7 This variety makes it more difficult to compare different models and might give
the impression that agents are simply implemented in such a way that they cannot help but
generate compositional languages. Moreover, there is often little in the way of psychological
motivation for the various implementations. Fortunately, Bayesian learning can provide just
such a psychologically motivated model for implementing agents, while also going some way to
alleviate the criticism of built-in compositionality.
6Note that this issue is closely related to the problem of grounding symbols in the world; see Vogt (2002); Vogt
and Divina (2007) for further discussion.




As mentioned in chapter 3, the manner in which agents have been implemented in ILMs raises a
number of issues: the lack of psychological motivation, the risk of building linguistic universals
into the model, and the difficulty comparing results from different models. Bayesian learning
provides a way of addressing all three of these issues.
A number of researchers (e.g. Chater and Manning, 2006; Chater and Christiansen, 2010;
Griffiths, 2011; Tenenbaum et al., 2011) have noted that learning a language is a problem of
induction or inference: on the basis of limited data, learners attempt to determine which utter-
ances are permissible in a language. That much is, I believe, fairly uncontroversial. Probability
theory provides a way of formalising questions of inference in a precise manner. More specifi-
cally, Bayesian probability theory has been used to formalise the kind of task language learners
face: given a set of data d and a prior (inductive) bias, i.e. a preference for a particular solution





where p(h) is the prior probability – that is, the inductive bias learners bring to the learning
task – of the hypothesis h, p(d|h) is the likelihood of the data d being generated by h, and p(d)






where H is the hypothesis space, the set of all hypotheses the learner chooses from. Since the
value of p(d) is constant for a fixed hypothesis space, equation 4.1 can be rewritten as
p(h|d) ∝ p(d|h)p(h). (4.3)
Given these formulae, a learner can calculate a distribution over hypotheses and then select
a hypothesis from this distribution. One way of doing so is simply to choose the hypothesis
with the highest posterior, or maximum a posteriori, distribution. An alternative method is to
sample a hypothesis when required according to their posterior distribution: thus a hypothesis
with twice the posterior probability of another hypothesis ought on average to be sampled twice
as often. How learners select hypotheses can have a profound impact on the dynamics of a
model.
Although Bayes’ rule has been known for many years – Bayes’ work was originally published
in 1763 –, Bayesian modelling of cognitive processes has recently become very popular, so much
so that Shultz (2007) speaks of “a revolution in cognitive science”. In recent years, Bayesian
inference has been used, among other things, to model category learning (Kemp et al., 2007),
reasoning about objects (Téglás et al., 2011), word learning (Xu and Tenenbaum, 2000, 2007;
Frank et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2010) and language learning and evolution (Griffiths and Kalish,
2005, 2007; Kirby et al., 2007; Smith and Kirby, 2008; Smith, 2009; Burkett and Griffiths, 2009,
2010; Perfors et al., 2010; Perfors and Navarro, ress). One advantage of modelling agents as
Bayesian learners is that the inference algorithm is determined not by the modeller – one of
the criticisms raised in the previous chapter – but by probability theory; this makes it easier
to compare results. It also provides a psychological basis for the cognitive process agents are
provided with, bringing theoretical work with ILMs closer in line with experimental research in
psychology.1 Another advantage is that a considerable amount of mathematical research has
been carried out in the field of probability theory. These results can be used in theoretical
models of cognition and then tested experimentally, to determine the best way of modelling
cognitive processes using probability theory.
There are, however, a number of possible objections to modelling humans as Bayesian learn-
ers. Firstly, we have no knowledge of how humans might carry out such inferential calculations.
This objection can be countered relatively easily. Marr (1982) distinguishes three levels of anal-
ysis with regard to cognitive processes. The computational level of analysis is concerned with
determining the task a cognitive process is meant to accomplish and the ideal way of doing so.
1This psychological foundation makes it more justifiable to refer to ILMs as agent-based cognitive models (Vogt,
2009).
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For example, to say that learning a language is about learning a language provides little insight;
to say that learning a language is about inferring a grammar on the basis of sparse data, on
the other hand, specifies the task in a way that makes it easier to determine the “ingredients”
necessary to accomplish it. The algorithmic level deals with the algorithm used to accomplish
the task at hand and the representations needed to do so. Finally, the implementational level is
concerned with how the algorithm used for a task is physically implemented, e.g. in a human’s
brain. The three levels differ in the degree of abstraction with which they analyse a task, with
the computational level providing the most abstract view. It is at this level that most research
using Bayesian learning is conducted. The objection voiced above, on the other hand, refers to
the implementational level. Clearly more research is needed to determine how Bayesian models
are implemented and which algorithms are used to infer hypotheses (some such work is under-
way; see, for example, Sanborn and Griffiths, 2006; Fiser et al., 2010); however, the fact that
we know little about the implementational details of Bayesian learning does not count against
a Bayesian analysis of cognition at the computational level.
Secondly, humans are not particularly good at calculating probabilities. Then again, most
humans are also not particularly good at carrying out differentiation in their heads, either – yet
they are perfectly capable of determining the trajectory of a ball so as to catch it. Similarly, even
with limited metalinguistic skills, people are capable of using language (although see Dabrowska,
2006, on the relationship between metalinguistic knowledge and grammaticality judgements).
Thus the fact that humans appear largely unable to consciously carry out a task they are meant
to be carrying out constantly need not count against Bayesian learning.
Thirdly, and more seriously, there is the question of how to determine the hypothesis space
for a particular task. If they are innate, then Bayesian language learning simply provides an
additional account of how UG might work. One possible solution is to say that the hypothesis
space is determined by the possible computations that the underlying implementation can carry
out. If that is so, then the hypothesis space is simply given a priori. Perfors et al. (2011) propose
distinguishing between the latent hypothesis space that contains all potential hypotheses and the
explicit hypothesis space that contains the hypotheses actually considered by a learner; however,
they do not explain how a hypothesis is generated, i.e. transferred from the latent to the explicit
hypothesis space.
Finally, a similar question arises concerning the prior bias. Must these biases be innate? No.
Griffiths and Kalish (2007) suggest that prior biases are simply a convenient way of summarising
all of the factors that might influence how a learner entertains. It may be that the outcome of one
learning process results in a prior bias regarding some other task. But this explanation can only
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go so far without leading to an infinite regress: the explanation of where prior biases originate
cannot be “it’s priors all the way down”, to paraphrase Hawking (1988). Nevertheless, it may
be possible that the prior biases for most tasks are derived from a small number of innate a
priori biases. However, which prior biases might depend on which and what these dependencies
look like is not an issue that can be dealt with on the computational level of analysis alone.
4.1 Bayesian language learning
Bayesian models have been used to model the evolution of language in a number of papers
(see references above), providing new and occasionally surprising insights into the factors that
shape language as it emerges by cultural transmission. One of these surprising results is that
of Griffiths and Kalish (2005, 2007), who show that the outcome of iterated learning by agents
who are Bayesian learners that choose a language by sampling from the posterior distribution
over possible languages simply reflects the agents’ prior distribution over those languages. This
finding is analytic, with the iterative process being modelled as a Markov chain. Unlike simu-
lations with agents implemented using other algorithms, the transmission bottleneck does not
affect the actual result of IL, merely the speed at which convergence occurs.
Kirby et al. (2007) expand on this result, demonstrating that Bayesian learners selecting a
hypothesis with maximum posterior probability are affected by the bottleneck, since the latter
affects the distribution over hypotheses an agent entertains by amplifying weak prior biases.
These findings suggest that it is not only the prior bias (and hence the hypothesis space), but
also agents’ strategies for selecting a hypothesis from the posterior, that affects the outcome
of Bayesian iterated learning. They are supported by Smith and Kirby (2008), who show that
these results hold under a number of different evolutionary scenarios. Cultural transmission
can shield weak biases from biological selection, since fitness – which is what ought to result
in selective pressures – is determined not just by the (possibly hereditary) prior bias, but also
by the (cultural) transmission process. Languages may, then, be shaped by the process of IL
and cultural transmission, if language learners are Bayesian learners selecting a hypothesis with
maximum posterior probability.
Dediu (2008), however, raises an issue concerning the results of both Griffiths and Kalish
(2007) and Kirby et al. (2007), an issue relating back to the second criticism of the ILM men-
tioned above. He shows that increasing the number of agents per cohort in each transmission
chain does not greatly affect the outcome of IL if both agents employ the same hypothesis
selection strategy. However, if agents in paired transmission chains use different strategies, the
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outcome more closely resembles that of transmission chains consisting only of agents sampling
from the posterior. In other words, it is not permissible simply to assume that results obtained
from transmission chains of single agents also hold for more complex chains – a point harking
back to Niyogi and Berwick (2009). Smith (2009) makes a similar point: if sampling Bayesian
learners are in fact facing the task of choosing a hypothesis on the basis of data generated by
multiple agents, the outcome of IL will not simply converge on learners’ prior biases. Instead,
transmission factors like the starting conditions of the simulation, the amount of data (i.e. the
transmission bottleneck that Griffiths and Kalish (2005, 2007) showed had no impact on the
ultimate outcome of IL) and an interaction between the amount of data and the prior, affect
the posterior distribution. Ferdinand and Zuidema (2009) reach a similar conclusion; however,
their analysis adds an important insight. If agents are sampling from the posterior distribution,
the agents within a population at time t will not necessarily all choose the same hypothesis with
which to produce data for the following cohort. This means that the data will be a sample from
the product of the agents’ individual posterior distributions. If learners are simply considering
the probability of the data being generated by a single distribution over hypotheses, the dis-
tribution they are attempting to determine, namely the one that generated the data, may not
be among the distributions they are evaluating. Once this is the case, Ferdinand and Zuidema
(2009) argue, the agents are no longer behaving like rational Bayesian learners.
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CHAPTER 5
The Burkett and Griffiths (2009) model
Burkett and Griffiths (2009, 2010)1 take Ferdinand and Zuidema (2009)’s insight and modify the
scenario outlined in Smith (2009). There, a population of agents consisting of discrete cohorts,
adults and learners, learn a single language by sampling a hypothesis regarding the language
spoken on the basis of data produced by agents in the previous cohort who themselves learned
a language from data provided by the previous cohort, in accordance with the ILM.2 However,
they learn only one language, despite the adult population generating data on the basis of two
different languages. Burkett and Griffiths (2009) suggest that such learners are not behaving
like rational Bayesian agents; instead, learners ought to take into account that the data are
produced by different speakers who might also be speaking different languages, that is, they
should be attempting to determine the distribution of languages within the population. Once








Here, it is assumed that all words are produced by the same hypothesis, and p(d) can be
calculated by summing over product of the likelihoods of each hypothesis producing these data
1For the remainder of the paper, I shall refer mostly to Burkett and Griffiths (2009), since both papers
essentially report the same findings, but Burkett and Griffiths (2009) also report the results of simulations using
a two-language scenario like the one used here.
2The data for the first cohort of learners is generated by sampling from the base distribution G0, described
below.
3Most of the formulae in this section are taken from Burkett and Griffiths (2009).
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where for each word w ∈ d, one must first determine the likelihood of it being produced by each
hypothesis h ∈ H before determining p(d) as the product of the likelihood of each word under
all hypotheses.
Burkett and Griffiths (2009) discuss two ways in which rational Bayesian agents might take
into account the diversity of hypotheses generating the data they receive; I shall only discuss
the second possibility, that of learning a distribution over languages rather than a particular
language. Furthermore, I shall discuss only the simplest case, where agents must learn a distri-
bution over just two languages l0 and l1, each consisting of a single word, w0 and w1 respectively.
Since the hypothesis space H that learners are operating in no longer consists of languages but
distributions over languages, and there are an arbitrary (and potentially infinite) number of pos-
sible distributions over two languages for learners to choose from, Burkett and Griffiths (2009)
propose modelling the hypothesis using a Dirichlet process (DP).4 The prior of a DP is param-
eterised by the base distribution G0, which specifies the learner’s a priori set of preferences for
the languages in H, and the concentration parameter α, which affects the number of languages
a learner believes there to be: the greater the value of α, the smaller the number of languages





where δi,j is Kronecker’s delta. In other words, the probability of l0 is p0, that of l1 is (1− p0).
In the two-language scenario, equation 5.2 can be expanded to describe the probability











with the probability of producing a word wi given by the formula
p(wi|lj) = (1− ε)δi,j εδ(1−i),j , (5.5)
where δi,j is again Kronecker’s delta and ε is a suitably small value representing the probability
4See Frigyik et al. (2010) for a thorough introduction to Dirichlet processes.
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of noise during production. Thus a speaker of l0 will produce w0 with probability (1 − ε) and
w1 with probability ε. Each learner a in the learner cohort (a ∈ A) receives |d| = 20 data
items, each of which is generated by first uniformly sampling an agent from the adult cohort
that then samples a language according to its hypothesis before finally producing a word from
the language selected according to equation 5.5.
To determine a hypothesis, learners in the Burkett and Griffiths (2009) model use a Gibbs
sampler implementing a Chinese Restaurant Process5: first, each w ∈ d is assigned to a cluster
cw, and each cluster c is assigned a language lc. Which cluster cw is sampled for a particular
word is determined by the distribution
p(c|w, lc, C) ∝
 ncp(w|lc) c is an existing clusterα∑lG0(l)p(w|l) c is a new cluster , (5.6)






This “rich get richer” approach means that clusters with more words assigned to them are more
likely to get a new word assigned to them.
The language lc assigned to a cluster is determined by sampling from the distribution




A hypothesis h is defined by
p(l|h) = nl + αG0(l)
|d|+ α
, (5.9)





It is clear from equation 5.9 that the value of α determines the extent to which G0 affects
a learner’s hypothesis. This sampling process is repeated for a number of times (five times in
Burkett and Griffiths, 2009), the final iteration providing the learner with a hypothesis regarding
the distribution of languages within the population.6
Burkett and Griffiths (2009) ran their simulations with 100 agents per cohort (|A| = 100),
5See Navarro and Perfors, 2010 for an excellent introduction to the Chinese Restaurant Process.
6The earlier iterations are used to “burn in” the Gibbs sampler.
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Figure 5.1: Replication of Burkett and Griffiths (2009)’s results of learning the distribution over two languages
with a Dirichlet process prior.
each of which received 20 data items from which to learn (|d| = 20). Each simulation ran for
50 generations with p0 = 0.6 and ε = 0.05. Figure 5.1 shows a replication of their results, with
the proportion of l0 speakers averaged over ten simulation runs (as opposed to 200 runs in the
original paper).7 The different graphs represent simulations with different initial probabilities
for the production of w0. The graphs closely match those in Burkett and Griffiths (2009) except
that for p(w0) = 0.5. However, according to K. Smith (personal communication, August 2011),
a high degree of variation in that particular case is relatively common in replications of these
results. Regardless of the structure of the initial data received by the first generation of learners,
if α is larger than approximately 8, the posterior distribution over hypotheses clearly converges
on the prior G0 defined in equation 5.3. As the value of α decreases, however, the outcome of
iterated learning increasingly magnifies weak biases in favour of l0 or l1. For example, even with
a weak bias in favour of l0, e.g. when p(w0) = 0.6, that language dominates the population
7The source code used in this dissertation is available here.
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Figure 5.2: Proportion of l0 spoken for different values of α, with the starting probability of w0 = 0.6. Note the
different scale of the x axis compared to figure 5.1.
for α ≤ 0.5. The transition from convergence to the prior distribution over hypotheses to
magnification of potentially weak prior biases takes place within the interval 0.125 ≤ α ≤ 8.
As figure 5.2 shows, populations with α values within this interval show greater variance with
regard to the proportion of l0 spoken. Variance is particularly great when α = 1.
5.1 A brief justification
Before continuing, it might be worthwhile briefly to ask whether such a model, where learners
choose between two very simple languages, but do so repeatedly by sampling from a distribution
over languages, can actually provide any insight into what humans are actually doing when
learning a language. Surely, one might object, even bilinguals don’t go around deciding whether
to make an utterance in, say, German or English!
It is indeed the case that people needn’t often choose between two languages without knowing
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which one would be more appropriate.8 If one thinks of what are being called languages as
alternatives within a language, the situation becomes more plausible. Take, for example, the
utterances kick down the door and kick the door down. Both are correct and mean the same
thing, yet they are based on different constructions. If l0 and l1 are interpreted as abstractions
of constructions of this kind, one can imagine learners acquiring and using them both, choosing
them according to their hypothesis regarding the distribution of the constructions in the English
language.
I hope this brief example provides sufficient justification to continue exploring the simple
two-language model.
5.2 Conclusion
The replication of Burkett and Griffiths (2009)’s results for the two-language scenario demon-
strates that the implementation used here approximates that of Burkett and Griffiths (2009)
sufficiently to carry out simulations that modify some of the assumptions their model makes.
8An exception to this rule does spring to mind, however. In the border region between (German-speaking)
Switzerland and (francophone) France, it is common courtesy for hikers to greet one another. How should one
greet strangers, “Grüezi” or “bonjour”, if one wishes to greet them in their native language? One might generate
a hypothesis over greetings on the basis of previous encounters, i.e. p(d), and one’s general inclination to use a
foreign language, i.e. one’s prior bias.
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CHAPTER 6
Modifications to the Burkett and Griffiths (2009) model
6.1 Introduction
The Burkett and Griffiths (2009) model makes a number of assumptions:
1. All agents within the population have the same value for α.
2. Each word in a learner’s input is sampled uniformly from the entire population.
3. Each word in a learner’s input is generated by an agent from the preceding cohort.
4. Learners generate a single hypothesis on the basis of their entire input.
Each of these assumptions help to simplify the model; however, they also make the model less
realistic. This is not a fault per se: the more realistic a model is, the more complex it becomes,
making it more likely that confounding factors may be introduced unwittingly. Nevertheless, it
is not unreasonable to make changes to the model to see whether the results hold in slightly
more realistic scenarios. The following simulations each modify a single assumption from the
list above.
6.2 Modification 1: heterogeneous population
Although not stated explicitly, it is clear from their exposition that in Burkett and Griffiths
(2009)’s model, all agents share the same value for α. While this assumption may not be unrea-
sonable, as it stands it appears to be a simplification for the purpose of modelling: regardless
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of how α might be assigned a value, there is no prima facie reason to take for granted that
a population of learners will be homogeneous in this respect. If the value is assigned by some
hereditary mechanism or other, a degree of variation would be required for natural selection to
choose a value from. If, on the other hand, the value of α is acquired, it may be influenced
by other factors known to affect language skills, such as a learner’s socioeconomic status (Hoff,
2003) or metalinguistic knowledge (Dabrowska, 2006), e.g. concerning the number of languages
being spoken. If a learner’s concentration parameter is itself set by sampling a distribution
arrived at by Bayesian learning, one would again expect the population to be heterogeneous
with regards to the value of α.1
In the first set of simulations, the assumption of a homogeneous population with regard to
the value of α is dropped. Instead, each cohort consists of two subsets of agents, A1 and A2,
with α1 = 32 and α2 = 0.125. These values were chosen because in homogeneous populations,
the two result in very different proportions of l0 being spoken (see Figure 5.1). Four different
simulations were run, with |A1| ∈ {50, 33, 25, 20}, respectively, and |A2| = |A| − |A1|. This
change apart, the simulations were run under the same conditions as the Burkett and Griffiths
(2009) model, i.e. |A| = 100, |d| = 20, p0 = 0.6 and p(w0) = 0.6.2
6.2.1 Results
Figure 6.1 shows the results of running simulations with different proportions of agents with
α = 32 and α = 0.125, respectively. It is clear from the graphs that the agents’ hypotheses
become more skewed in favour of l0 as the share of agents with α = 0.125 increases. Furthermore,
the results show far greater variance than in the original Burkett and Griffiths (2009) model.
However, the proportion of l0 spoken is not simply a reflection of the population’s mean α value.
Take, for example, the case where α = 32 for 25% of the agents within each cohort. This is
equivalent to a mean α of approximately 8 for the entire population.3 As figure 5.1 shows, in
a homogeneous population, the proportion of l0 spoken when α = 8 is approximately that of
the prior, i.e. 0.6. In a heterogeneous population, however, this proportion increases to over
0.8. Figure 6.2 makes the difference clearer by comparing the outcome of IL for homogeneous
populations with α values of 8 and 16, respectively, with IL in heterogeneous populations whose
means for α approximate these values.4
At first sight, it seems as though there were additional dynamics at work affecting the agents’
1This point is reminiscent of the one raised by Ferdinand and Zuidema (2009) regarding the Bayesian rationality
of populations of Bayesian learners sampling hypotheses from the posterior.
2Unless stated otherwise, these values were used for all simulations reported in this chapter; all results are
averaged over 10 runs.
3Specifically, 0.25 ∗ 32 + 0.75 ∗ 0.125 = 8.09375.
4This is the case where the proportion of agents with α = 32 is 25% and 50%, respectively.
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Figure 6.1: Comparison of simulations with populations consisting of different proportions of agents with α = 32
and α = 0.125. Note the different scale of the y axis compared to figure 5.2.
hypotheses. The effect of this is reminiscent of that reported in Smith (2009): an increase in the
proportion of learners with α = 0.125 has a disproportionate effect on the outcome of iterated
learning. On reflection, however, an alternative explanation building on Ferdinand and Zuidema
(2009)’s argument seems more reasonable. Agents in this simulation work on the assumption
that the data they receive was generated by agents with the same value for α as they have.
Clearly that will not be case: when α = 32 for, say, 50% of the population, on average, half of
an agent’s data will have been produced by an agent with an α value different from its own.
The hypothesis that produced a learner’s data will therefore more often than not be outwith the
learner’s hypothesis space: the learner is no longer a rational Bayesian agent. To regain their
Bayesian rationality, agents would have to take into account the fact that different words were
potentially produced by agents with different α values. One way of dealing with this is discussed
in chapter 7.
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of the outcome of iterated learning in heterogeneous populations (blue), shown here with
approximate average α values, and homogeneous populations (yellow) with a similar average α value.
6.3 Modification 2: cultural parents
In Burkett and Griffiths (2009), the agents producing input for each learner are drawn uniformly
from the preceding cohort. As a result, each word a learner hears might be uttered by a different
agent. However, this is not normally the case for human language learners. On the one hand,
language communities may be too large or too widely dispersed to allow teachers to be drawn
so uniformly. On the other hand, most children will be exposed more to the language of their
principle and secondary caregivers – such as their parents, other relatives, and their parents’
friends – than to that of the proverbial man on the Clapham omnibus. This has implications for
the variety of input children receive. For example, the input caregivers provide their children
with is determined in part by their socioeconomic status (Hoff, 2003). Furthermore, children
do not appear to weight the contribution of different caregivers equally (Pancsofar and Vernon-
Feagans, 2006). Thus, even if one assumes that learners receive equal amounts of input with
which to determine a posterior distribution over hypotheses, the input may have been generated
from small subsets of the speaker community that may differ greatly for different learners.
To approximate this situation, the data sampling process was modified. Rather than sam-
pling an adult for each data item to be generated, a fixed number np of cultural parents were
sampled from the adult cohort. Each cultural parent then generated the same number |dp| of
data items. In each simulation, np and |dp| were chosen such that |d| = np|dp| = 20. This sam-
pling procedure increases the likelihood of an agent ai being selected to generate |dp| items from
( 1|A|)
|dp| to 1|A| and ought on average to lead to a reduction in the number of hypotheses used to
generate the data a learner receives while maintaining the same total amount of input. It not
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only more closely resembles the situation faced by human learners, but also makes it possible to
separate the effects of reducing variety in learners’ input from the amount of input they receive.
Merely reducing the amount of data learners receive would confound these two factors.
6.3.1 Results
Figure 6.3: Outcome of simulations run with data being generated by 2, 4, 5, and 10 cultural parents, compared
with the original results of Burkett and Griffiths (2009) where p(w0) = 0.6.
Figure 6.3 shows the results of simulations run with 2, 4, 5 and 10 parents, respectively,
generating a learner’s input. Changing the amount of variety in the hypotheses that generate
agents’ input appears to have little impact on the outcome of IL. Even when α = 1, i.e. at
the point with the greatest amount of variance in the original Burkett and Griffiths (2009)
model, decreasing the amount of variation does not have a consistent effect on the outcome of
iterated learning, as figure 6.4 shows. For comparison, figure 6.5 shows the effect of reducing
both hypothesis variety and the number of data items, |d| = 5 and 10, respectively. Again, the
outcome of the simulations approximates that for |d| = 20, except where variance is greatest in
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Figure 6.4: Comparison of the proportion of l0 spoken when α = 1 with 2, 4, 5, and 10 cultural parents. There is
no clear relationship discernible between the amount of variation in hypotheses generating the data, which grows
smaller as the number of cultural parents decreases, and the outcome of the iterated learning process.
the original model, i.e. for 0.25 ≤ α ≤ 2. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show how the proportion of l0
differs for different |d| when α is 1 and 0.5 respectively. While input size appears to have an
effect when α = 0.5, the small sample size of ten runs make it impossible to draw any clear
conclusions.
To summarize, then, neither the amount of variation in the hypotheses generating input
for learners, nor the absolute amount of input learners receive, appears to have a significant
impact on the outcome of the simulations. This confirms Griffiths and Kalish (2005, 2007)’s
findings that Bayesian learners sampling from their posterior are not affected by a transmission
bottleneck.
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Figure 6.5: Outcome of simulations run with 5, 10 and 20 data items. the transitional interval aside, the outcome
is roughly the same, regardless of the amount of input learners receive.
6.4 Modification 3: incremental Bayesian learning
In Burkett and Griffiths (2009), learners generate a hypothesis by processing all of their input at
once. Anyone with children – in fact, anyone who has heard young children speak – will question
whether this is an accurate approximation of how children acquire language. The CHILDES
database (MacWhinney, 2000) provides numerous examples of how a child’s language changes
as it grows up, suggesting that, if children are engaged in some form of Bayesian learning, then
this process may be incremental.5
To verify that Burkett and Griffiths (2009)’s results hold when agents engage in incremental
Bayesian learning, the following changes were made to the model. For each learner, adults are
uniformly sampled from their cohort to generate a total of |d| data items. The learner then
generates a hypothesis h0 on the basis of its prior bias and the set of data containing just the
5Yang (2004) proposes an incremental model, with learners reassigning weights to all of the grammars within
their hypothesis space after each data item they receive; his agents, however, are not Bayesian learners.
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Figure 6.6: Comparison of the proportion of l0 when |d| =
20, 10, and 5; α = 1
Figure 6.7: Comparison of proportion of l0 when |d| = 20,
10, and 5; α = 0.5
first item sampled, d0 = {w0}, w0 ∈ d. For each new data item wi, the learner generates a new
hypothesis on the basis of h(i−1) and di = {wi} ∪ d(i−1):
p(hi|di) ∝ p(di|h(i−1))p(h(i−1)), (6.1)
where the posterior p(hi|di) is computed using the hypothesis generated in the previous step,
p(h(i−1)), rather than the prior p(h).
6.4.1 Results
Figure 6.8 presents the results of determining a hypothesis incrementally. As before, the results
coincide with those of Burkett and Griffiths (2009) when α is large (i.e. α ≥ 5) or small (α ≤
0.25). However, the transition from convergence to the prior, on the one hand, to magnification
of the prior, on the other, occurs more rapidly, and for higher values of α, than in the original
model. Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show how the proportion of l0 changes during the iterated learning
cycle, with values averaged over all of the agents in all ten runs of each simulation. In the case
of incremental Bayesian learners, for values of α outwith the transition interval, the proportion
of l0 is virtually constant across all generations. This is somewhat difficult to explain: since the
input for the first generation is generated according to the prior distribution over languages, one
would expect a development similar to that of batch learners, i.e. with the first generation’s
posterior hypothesis reflecting the input they received. The difference may be due in part to
the learners’ apparent insensitivity to the amount of input they receive, shown in section 6.3:
if learners can converge on a hypothesis favouring a single language with just five data items,
incremental Bayesian learning might be akin to repeated sampling from data generated by the
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Figure 6.8: Outcome of purely incremental learning, compared to the results of Burkett and Griffiths (2009)
same hypothesis. Since a low α value suggests that the data is generated by fewer languages,
learners may discard more words from the language underrepresented in their input as being
erroneous.
6.5 Modification 4: horizontal transmission
As in the majority of ILMs, the data learners are provided with are generated by the previous
cohort. However, it is widely assumed that children’s development is influenced by their peers
(e.g. Harris, 1995). This applies to children’s linguistic development, too: consider the number
of times adults lament that teenagers “can’t talk properly”, or that they don’t understand what
young people are saying to one another. This intuitive notion is supported by research in a
number of areas. For example, according to Senghas and Coppola (2001) and Senghas et al.
(2004), the increase in the complexity of Nicaraguan Sign Language – a language that has only
emerged over the past three decades – can be attributed largely to the successive cohorts of new
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Figure 6.9: Development of the proportion of l0, batch Bayesian learning (Burkett and Griffiths, 2009, model)
language learners adapting the language when communicating with their peers, rather than to
innovation by fluent speakers.6 Mashburn et al. (2009) report that, in hearing children, too, the
language skills of their peers have a measurable impact on children’s language skills. Research on
bilingual education (Chesterfield et al., 1983) also suggests that the language skills of peers play
an important role in shaping other learners’ language skills. Vogt (2005) argues that iterated
learning models that rely solely on vertical transmission cannot distinguish between regularity
resulting from a transmission bottleneck imposed by the modeller and regularity that arises
due to learners’ creativity. He goes on to show that, in an iterated learning model, horizontal
transmission can act as an implicit bottleneck.
The following simulations introduce horizontal transmission in two different ways. The first
simulation uses a two-step model where learners generate two hypotheses, once after receiving
data from adults and again after receiving data from other learenrs. The second model combines
horizontal transmission and incremental Bayesian learning.
6See Senghas and Coppola (2001) for a brief history of Nicaraguan Sign Language.
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Figure 6.10: Development of the proportion of l0, incremental Bayesian learning
6.5.1 Horizontal transmission in two steps
In this simulation, learners generate hypotheses at two points during the learning process. Ini-
tially, learners receive input from agents of the previous cohort (da) and generate a hypothesis
concerning the distribution of languages within the population. Next, learners are called upon to
generate input for each other (dl), which is then used by learners to generate a second, final hy-
pothesis. Two sets of simulations were run with |da| = 5 and 10, respectively, and |dl| = |d|−|da|,
with |d| = 20.
Results
Figure 6.11 shows the outcome of the simulations described above. Again, the overall results
confirm Burkett and Griffiths (2009)’s findings: for high values of α, agents’ hypotheses converge
on their prior distributions over languages, whereas for small values of α, IL magnifies the starting
conditions of the simulation, favouring l0. However, for values of α around 1, the results differ,
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Figure 6.11: Outcome of two-step horizontal transmission, with parental input making up 100%, 50% or 25% of
the input to learners
as figure 6.12 shows, albeit not greatly. Again, it is not possible to discern a general trend
resulting from the amount of parental input: although figure 6.12 shows the proportion of l0 to
be higher for decreasing amounts of data from agents of the previous cohort, the proportion of
l0 is actually closer to the results of the original model when parental input makes up 25% of a
learner’s input than when agents from the previous cohort provide 50% of learners’ input. This
may, again, reflect the fact that the neither the amount of data nor the variety within the data
has a significant impact on the outcome of iterated learning, as reported in section ??.
6.5.2 Horizontal transmission with incremental Bayesian learning
In the second simulation using horizontal transmission, learners again generate a first hypothesis
on the basis of initial input da from adult speakers. Having done so, they again only receive input
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Figure 6.12: Proportion of l0 spoken after two-step hori-
zontal transmission with parental input making up 100%,
50% or 25% of the input to learners, α = 1
from other learners. This time, however, they learn incrementally, generating a new hypothesis
after each new data item as outlined in section 6.4.
Results
The results presented in figure 6.13 are the outcome of IL with |da| = 10. As in simulations
discussed earlier, for high values of α, learners acquire a hypothesis that reflects their prior bias,
whereas low α values result in hypotheses that amplify the starting conditions of the simulation,
with agents learning hypotheses that prefer a single language. Again, for intermediate values of
α, the results differ. As figure 6.14 shows, learning progresses in a way similar to that of pure
incremental learning, with learners who have particularly high or low values for α converging
to the ultimate hypothesis within a single generation. Again, this may be due to the fact
that incremental learning approximates iterated learning within individual agents as a result of
agents’ indifference to changes in the amount of input the receive, as suggested in section 6.4.1.
6.6 Discussion
The results presented in this chapter expand on those of Burkett and Griffiths (2009): as α
increases (α → ∞), learners’ hypotheses converge to the prior G0. For α → 0, on the other
hand, learners generate hypotheses that amplify the initial conditions of the simulation. These
results are valid in a number of scenarios that each modify one of the simplifying assumptions
made by Burkett and Griffiths (2009). Together, the results confirm that the value assigned to
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Figure 6.13: Horizontal learning with incremental Bayesian learners, |da| = 10
the concentration parameter α is crucial in determining the outcome of iterated learning with
Bayesian agents under a wide variety of learning conditions. In this light, Burkett and Griffiths
(2009, 2010)’s interpretation of their findings is somewhat puzzling. They appear to suggest
that a high value for α is somehow a more “natural” assumption (Burkett and Griffiths, 2010,
p.65):
However, if we explicitly encode a bias in the agent towards believing that the teach-
ers all share a single hypothesis, then we may observe results that more closely align
with the initial condition.
The formulation suggests that learners ought to assume a priori that teachers use different
languages. But why should they do that? Take the extreme case, shown in chapter 5 above,
where p(w0) = 0. Despite the proportion of l0 initially only being ε, for α→∞, learners end up
using l0 60% of the time. This is not quite the obvious default behaviour Burkett and Griffiths
(2010) make it out to be. While it may be case that learners have high α values, the only
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Figure 6.14: Cross-generational progress of horizontal-incremental learning for |da| = 10
argument that Burkett and Griffiths (2010) present in favour of this claim is that the outcome
of simulations with high values for α more closely correlate with the outcome of learning from
a single teacher. This is, I feel, a problematic line of argument. Firstly, it fails to take into
consideration that under normal circumstances, humans are far more likely to have multiple
teachers. To present the case of single teachers in support of assuming a particular way of
learning from multiple teachers gives the impression of explaining the general case by recourse
to a special one. Secondly, as Niyogi and Berwick (2009) point out, assuming transmission
chains consisting of single agents per cohort restricts the dynamics of the transmission process
and therefore its potential effects.
Rather than simply assuming that learners assign α a high value, it seems to me more
worthwhile to ask which value learners assign to the concentration parameter. This is the
question that will be addressed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
Learning the concentration parameter α
7.1 Introduction
The models presented here so far have been simple modifications of that of Burkett and Griffiths
(2009), with each model modifying one of the assumptions made in the latter. In each case,
the concentration parameter α has been determined by the modeller, and determining the effect
of assigning α different values has been one of the purposes of the models. If, however, one
acknowledges that the value of α plays a part in determining the outcome of iterated language
learning – and all of the results presented thus far strongly suggest that it does –, it seems natural
to ask how the value for the concentration parameter α might be set without the intervention
of a god-like modeller. Broadly speaking, there are two possible hypotheses of how the value
of α might be set; I shall refer to them as the “natural” and the “cultural” origin hypothesis
regarding the value of α, respectively.1
7.1.1 The natural origin hypothesis
The natural origins hypothesis would claim that humans have evolved a certain value for α.
While this can be made to sound fairly convincing, the hypothesis runs into the same problems
as hypotheses suggesting hereditary strong biases of other kinds. As discussed in chapter 2,
strong domain-specific biases for particular values of α are unlikely to have evolved because the
process of cultural transmission is capable of shielding weak biases from selection (Smith and
1It is important to note that I am putting forward both hypotheses, essentially as straw men (but with no
malice aforethought); I am not aware of any work in this specific area, although Perfors and Navarro (in press)
might be considered to be discussing certain aspects of the problem.
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Kirby, 2008) and because the rate of language change is too fast for biological mechanisms to
track sepcific linguistic features (Christiansen and Chater, 2008). It may of course be the case
that α is determined by some hereditary trait within a domain other than language; what would
then have to be explained, however, is how it can influence the development of (supposedly
domain-specific) UG. This would lead back quite naturally to the debate between Hauser et al.
(2002) and Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) concerning the nature of the language faculty.
Perfors and Navarro (in press) present an alternative natural explanation: it may be that the
value for alpha is determined by the structure of the world. However, it is not entirely clear which
particular aspect of the world might lead learners to assume that the concentration parameter
has a particular value. Furthermore, this approach raises the question of where exactly the
structure of the world is meant to lie: since it is only by perceiving that we come to know this
structure, and perception is a cognitive process, this might simply amount to saying that there
are ways in which different cognitive modules can affect one another.
7.1.2 The cultural origin hypothesis
If α is not determined biologically, its value must be set by some cultural means or other. For
example, learners might make assumptions about the structure of their social surroundings: if
everybody they interact with looks alike, they might assume that everybody speaks the same
language and hence assign α a low value. This might allow a model such as that of Perfors and
Navarro (in press), mentioned above, to apply to a cultural explanation of setting α as well.
An alternative might be to assume that learners are engaged in learning not only a distribu-
tion over languages but also the appropriate value for α. They would, then be faced with the
task of learning a complex hypothesis (h, α) on the basis of p(h, α|d). One way they might go
about doing so is that presented in Kemp et al. (2007), who describe how learners can acquire
overhypotheses – essentially hypotheses that restrict the hypothesis space to be searched at a
different level – using a hierarchical Bayesian model. A similar approach can be applied to
learning α here. The following section describes such a model.
7.2 The model
The task learners face is to determine a complex hypothesis (h, α), consisting of a distribution
over languages h and a value for α, on the basis of the distribution
p(h, α|d) = p(d|h)p(h|α)p(α), (7.1)
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where p(h|α) is the conditional probability of h given α, p(α) is the prior probability of α, and








Here, p(w|l) defined as in equation 5.5. As in the Burkett and Griffiths (2009) model, determining
p(l|h) exactly is not possible but must instead be sampled as part of the process described below.
Each agent samples a complex hypothesis (h, α) from its posterior distribution p(h, α|d) using
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm based on the Chinese Restaurant Process: initially, the agent
is provided with |d| data items. It then determines a value for α by sampling a value for ln(α)
from a Gaussian distribution with mean µ = 1 and standard deviation σ = 1. This method
has the advantage of providing a probability density function for α in the shape of a log-normal
distribution, which can be used to determine p(α). Next, the agent generates an assignment of




N+α c is an existing cluster
α
N+α c is a new cluster
, (7.3)
where C is the set of all clusters, nc is the number of items assigned to cluster c and N is the
number of items assigned so far. For K clusters with data items assigned, N =
∑
1≤k≤K nk.
Items are assigned to clusters until N = |d|. The agent then assigns a language l to the cluster
according to the distribution
p(l) ∝ G0(l) (7.4)
Note that both the assignments of “data items” and of languages to clusters are independent
of w ∈ d, i.e. the data the agent has actually been provided with; they are essentially being
generated randomly. Together, the sampled values for α and assignments allow the agent to
generate a hypothesis according to equation 5.9. Next, the agent determines p(d|h) according
to equation 7.2. With this done, all of the elements of equation 7.1 are in place and the agent
can calculate p(h, α|d). This entire process (with the exception of being provided with data)
is repeated to determine a second complex hypothesis defined by p(h′, α′|d). The agent adopts
the complex hypothesis (h′, α′) if p(h′, α′|d) > p(h, α|d) ; if this condition is not met, it adopts
(h′, α′) with probability α
′
α .
The process of generating a new complex hypothesis is repeated 1000 times per agent, with
the outcome of the final iteration being adopted by the agent as its hypothesis.
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Figure 7.1: Value of α and proportion of l0 spoken after learning a hypothesis for (h, α) under different conditions;
results from simulations with the same initial conditions are coloured the same. m(α) refers to the mean of the
prior (log-normal) distribution for α.
7.3 Results
Figure 7.1 shows the outcome of learning a complex hypothesis (h, α). As one can see on the left,
learners appear to converge to their prior distribution over languages, just as they did for large
values of α previously. However, as one can see on the right, the values of α are considerably
lower than the Burkett and Griffiths (2009) model (and the variations thereof presented above)
would lead us to expect given the proportion of l0 being spoken. The proportion of l0 in the initial
data, p(w0), does not appear to have any significant impact on the outcome of iterated learning.
Figure 7.1 suggests that it may have influenced the amount of variance in the proportion of l0
for p(w0) = 0.3, but the small number of runs being compared and the amount of variance in
the outcomes for individual agents make it difficult to draw any hard and fast conclusions.
Although values for α do not converge to the prior, the agents’ prior bias regarding α is
reflected in the mean value of α, as figure 7.1 shows: the mean value for α in the condition where
m(α) = e1.75 is roughly 2.1 times that of the condition where m(α) = e, which is approximately
the ratio of the priors’ means, e
1.75
e . This result might indicate the onset of convergence to a
value for α smaller than the prior, although the large variance in the results mean that such
a claim is problematic (or possibly premature). Nevertheless, this is potentially an interesting
result: as mentioned in section 6.6, Burkett and Griffiths (2009) seem to assume that learners
have a default preference for large values of α. If the tendency for α to assume values smaller
than m(α) were borne out in future simulations, then that assumption may have to be revised.
Surprisingly, iterated learning does not seem to have an effect on the learning outcome,
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Figure 7.2: Development of p(l0) over time, m(α) =
e, p(w0) = 0.3
Figure 7.3: Development of α over time, m(α) =
e, p(w0) = 0.3
Figure 7.4: Development of p(l0) over time, m(α) =
e, p(w0) = 0.6
Figure 7.5: Development of α over time, m(α) =
e, p(w0) = 0.6
either: as figures 7.2 to 7.7 show, throughout the learning process, both α and the share of l0
vary greatly, with no apparent convergence. Thus, although agents appear to be converging to
the prior if one looks merely at the mean share of l0, in fact agents seem to be opting for an
extremely wide variety of hypotheses that often reflect neither their prior biases nor the starting
conditions of the simulation. The scatterplots in figures 7.8 to 7.13 confirm that there is no
correlation between the value for α and the hypothesis regarding the proportion of l0 within the
population. It is clearly visible that agents tend to have a preference for a hypothesis reflecting
their prior bias regarding the distribution of languages, but this does not change over time: the
complex hypotheses agents acquire after 45 cohorts are just as widely distributed as those seen
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Figure 7.6: Development of p(l0) over time, m(α) =
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Figure 7.7: Development of α over time, m(α) =
e1.75, p(w0) = 0.6
after a single cohort.
7.4 Discussion
The results presented here are rather surprising, since Kemp et al. (2007) show that hierarchical
Bayesian models of the kind presented here are capable of making the kind of inferences that
would be necessary to learn (h, α), and Perfors et al. (2006, 2010) show how a similar model
is capable of selecting a hypothesis made up of a type of grammar and a specific instantiation
of such a grammar.2 A possible explanation for this discrepancy, especially between Kemp
et al. (2007)’s results and those presented here, is the amount of learning each agent undertook:
whereas agents in this model select a hypothesis after 1000 iterations of the sampling process,
Kemp et al. (2007)’s agents ran 50000 iterations. It may be the case that the agents in the
current model would also have shown greater signs of convergence after that number of iterations;
unfortunately, computational limitations made it impossible to run that many iterations.3
One result – or possibly a hint of a result – is that agents may be converging on α values below
m(α). This incipient convergence is influenced by the learners’ prior bias regarding α, rather
than being an absolute preference for a particular value. It may be that this is a spurious effect
which would disappear after a few thousand more iterations of the sampling process; it might,
however, be the beginning of learners converging on low values of α. If this could be shown
2It should be noted that both models are concerned with a single generation of learners, not iterated learning.
3A single run of the model described in section 7.2 took approximately 55 minutes to complete 1000 iterations
on the hardware available. Ten runs of the model with a single set of initial conditions and 50000 iterations would
thus have taken roughly 19 days to complete.
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Figure 7.8: Composition of (h, α) in generation 1,
m(α) = e, p(w0) = 0.3
Figure 7.9: Composition of (h, α) in generation 46,
m(α) = e, p(w0) = 0.3
Figure 7.10: Composition of (h, α) in generation 1,
m(α) = e, p(w0) = 0.6
Figure 7.11: Composition of (h, α) in generation 46,
m(α) = e, p(w0) = 0.6
to be the case, e.g. by running simulations with more iterations of the sampling process, this
would mean that Burkett and Griffiths (2009, 2010)’s assumption regarding learners’ preference
for high values of α may need revising. The latter’s results would still hold, of course; however,
depending on the value for α that learners converged on, the fact that they converge on the
prior distribution over languages for α → ∞ may be less significant for modelling the human
language acquisition process than previously assumed.
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Figure 7.12: Composition of (h, α) in generation 1,
m(α) = e, p(w0) = 0.3
Figure 7.13: Composition of (h, α) in generation 46,





The results presented in the previous two chapters fall into two broad categories. Chapter 6
presents a series of results showing that the general findings of Burkett and Griffiths (2009, 2010)
– i.e. that small values of α allow the initial input learners receive to affect their hypotheses,
leading to hypotheses that magnify imbalances within the input, whereas large α values result in
agents’ hypotheses converging to their prior bias regarding the distribution of languages within
the population – apply to a broader range of scenarios than previously known. Chapter 7, on
the other hand, is an attempt to go beyond the original model and determine which α value
learners select if it is not provided by the modeller but must instead be learned along with the
distribution over languages in the population.
Section 6.3 shows that Burkett and Griffiths (2009)’s results are insensitive to the amount
of variety within the hypotheses that generate learners’ input and the absolute amount of data
they receive. It makes little difference whether data is generated by 2, 4, 5, 10, or 20 adults
from the previous cohort, or whether they receive 5, 10, or 20 data items as input: the outcome
of IL closely resembles that of the original model. In section 6.4, learners engage in incremental
Bayesian learning. Again, Burkett and Griffiths (2009)’s results are largely confirmed. However,
for low values of α, learners converge to a hypothesis favouring a single language far more quickly
than in the original model. As stated in section 6.4.1, this may be due to agents’ indifference
to the amount of input they receive. Allowing horizontal as well as vertical transmission as
in section 6.5 does not alter the outcome of IL greatly either, although horizontal-incremental
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learning exhibits the same accelerated convergence to hypotheses favouring a single language as
pure incremental learning. One scenario, that of populations consisting of agents with different α
values (section 6.2), may at first seem to challenge Burkett and Griffiths (2009)’s results; however,
as discussed in section 6.2.1, a possible explanation for this is that agents in this scenario are
not behaving like rational Bayesian agents since they are essentially selecting a hypothesis on
the assumption that the data they receive as input was generated by a homogeneous population.
Although their findings are shown to be more widely applicable than was previously known
to be the case, it does not follow that Burkett and Griffiths (2009, 2010)’s interpretation of their
results also gain additional support. In fact, their interpretation is somewhat curious. They
appear to be suggesting that, by default, learners have a high α value because when that is so,
the results of learning from multiple teachers coincide with those for single-agent transmission
chains, presented by Griffiths and Kalish (2005, 2007). At the same time they acknowledge that
learning from a single teacher is essentially a special case of learning from multiple teachers. This
creates the impression that the special case is being used to support a particular interpretation of
the general case. Instead, it seems more reasonable to say that whether the findings of Griffiths
and Kalish (2005, 2007) apply to human language learning depends on whether learners can
be assumed to have a high α value. In addition, the results of chapter 6 show that there is an
interval for values of α of approximately 0.25 ≤ α ≤ 2 where the outcome of IL is less clearcut.
It is in this interval that the modified scenarios also show the greatest degree of divergence from
the original model. Yet Burkett and Griffiths (2009, 2010) barely discuss this facts, limiting
themselves instead to the effects of α→∞ and α→ 0.
The model presented in chapter 7 attempts to show how learners might acquire a particular
value for α, rather than simply assuming it is given, as Burkett and Griffiths (2009, 2010)
do. Learners acquire a complex hypothesis (h, α), consisting of both a hypothesis about the
distribution of languages within the population and a value for α. The results of the simulations
run with this model are far less conclusive than those of chapter 6. There appears to be no
convergence whatsoever, either on a particular value for α or a particular distribution over
languages h. One possible explanation for this is that learners have not had enough time to
“mull their data over”, that is, the number of iterations they performed to sample a complex
hypothesis (h, α) was not large enough. However, increasing the number of iterations to that of
similar simulations, e.g. Kemp et al. (2007), was not possible for practical reasons. Thus it may
be the case that allowing agents 50000 iterations, as opposed to a “paltry” 1000, might have
resulted in convergence to a particular complex hypothesis; the results presented are sadly not
sufficient to allow such a conclusion to be drawn.
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One particular aspect of the results from chapter 7 is worth noting, however. It was shown
that although there was a great deal of variance, the mean value for α within the population was
significantly below the mean of the prior for α, yet there appeared to be a correlation between the
mean m(α) of the prior and the mean of α within the population. This suggests that the value
of α is sensitive to iterated learning and that learners may indeed be able to acquire a complex
hypothesis of both α and a distribution over languages. It might also suggest that learners do
not, as Burkett and Griffiths (2009, 2010) assume, have a “natural” preference for high values
of α. Whether that is indeed the case, however, depends on whether this apparent effect is
maintained in a simulation that produces more conclusive results, e.g. in a simulation with, say,
10000 or 50000 iterations of the sampling process. For such a result to then be applicable to
language learning, will also depend on whether the log-normal prior chosen for α reflects the
kind of prior biases human learners have.
8.2 Conclusion
This dissertation has provided evidence that Bayesian learners sampling from their posterior dis-
tribution converge to a hypothesis reflecting their prior bias under a wide variety of conditions.
It has also shown how these results might be expanded to determine whether the conditions
necessary for convergence to the prior to occur can emerge as the result of iterated learning.
Although the results with regards to the latter are inconclusive, they do at least hint that iter-
ated learning may indeed influence the variables that determine whether such convergence takes
place or not, thereby allowing Bayesian learners to acquire the necessary complex hypotheses.
However, more research is needed to determine whether this possibility is real or only a tempo-
rary, and basically coincidental, state of the sampling algorithm used here. Simulations with a
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